Abstract. The grid has emerged as a platform that enables to put in place an inter-organizational shared space known as Virtual Organization. The Virtual Organization (VO) encompasses users and resources supplied by the different partners for achieving the VO's creation goal. Though many works offer solutions to manage a VO, the dynamic, on the fly creation of virtual organizations is still a challenge. Dynamic creation of VOs is associated with the automated generation of access control policy to trace its boundaries, specify the different partners' rights within it and assure its management during its life time. In this paper, we propose an OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control model) based Virtual Organization model which serves as a corner stone in the VO creation automated process. OrBAC framework specifies the users' access permissions/interdiction to the VO resources, where its administration model AdOrBAC flexibly models the multi-stakeholder administration in the Grid.
Introduction
In today's demanding business and the rapid technological advancement, organizations tend to compete by investing and excelling in strategic products or services rather training and developing dedicated skills in several domains concurrently. Massive data volumes treatment, long complex computations, unique or critical resources exploitation are examples of applications that necessitate special expertises and resources to deal with. Enterprises are inclined to form supply chains of specialized partners outsourcing business processes via cooperation agreements. Grid technologies played an important role as an infrastructure for realizing such internet-based collaborations [3, 4, 17] . The grid, from a user's point of view, is a virtual powerful device based on coordinated resources supplied by different partners. However, from administrative point of view, it is a dynamic sharing space called Virtual Organization (VO) that includes users, resources and sharing relationships [1, 3, 4, 5] .
Building a VO, in an open environment as the Internet, necessitates enclosing its boundaries. These boundaries encircle legitimate users and resources introduced by the different partners. In addition, it entails sharing relationships which specifies the way and the contexts of usage as: Physicians may use Computing-Device and store data within work time. As a way to achieve that, access control policies may be employed to restrain resources access (computing device, storage space) to legitimate users (physicians) in certain contexts (work time). However, in addition to the large number of users and resources, the complexity of access control in Virtual Organizations rises from the fact that multiple access stakeholders are involved [5, 8] . Each partner needs to keep control on his local assets (add, remove, modify permissions) without compromising discretion or delegating administration to other domains [5] . For example, a client domain needs to manage his users without referring back to the resource provider. To sum up, a VO turns out to be a shared space with multiple access stakeholders, dynamic users and dynamic resources.
Current VO management solutions offer mechanisms to enforce access control policies. These solutions propose the use of access control lists [17] at the different resources sites or employ identity certificates with an out-of-band access control policy [6, 7, 8] . This vagueness in dealing with policy (static out of band) is unsuitable with the VO dynamics where security policy inconsistencies arise upon dynamically adding or removing users and resources. Policy management becomes essential to prevent security breaches and this in its turn necessitates that partners administrative responsibilities be clear and well specified. We propose a methodology to automate VOs creation starting first with the discovery of potential providers, acquiring access rights to certain resources and finally enforcing the access control policy on runtime upon resources allocation. In this paper, we focus on an access control management model that constitutes the corner stone on the way to dynamic VO creation and management [1] . The selection of an access control model is done according to the identified criteria of selection which are: the need to separate policy from the dynamic infrastructure and the separation of administrative tasks among the different partners.
Based on these criteria, an access control model should be chosen to specify the users-resources relationships. Meanwhile its administration model specifies partners' administrative relationships and thus VO access control policy creation and management. Comparing different access control models as DAC, MAC, RBAC, CBAC(Coalition Based Access Control) [9, 10, 11, 18] , we argue that OrBAC (Organization based Access Control) [12] is the most appropriate in our context. ORBAC abstracts users, actions and objects with role, activity and view where its administration model AdOrBAC [14] flexibly models the different administration responsibilities within an organization. This paper starts by introducing the grid environment and its virtual organization notion. In section 3 we cite some of the grid environment characteristics relevant to the access control. To well place our work we show the VO life cycle in section 4 to discuss the choice of an access control model in section 5. Sections 6 introduces OrBAC access control model and AdOrBAC its administration model. In section 7 we show the VO model where in section 8 we discuss some modeling issues and finally we conclude with future works.
The Grid
The term "Grid" was adopted in resemblance to the electric grid to designate a powerful system where a pool of distributed devices confederates to allow an authorized user to plug for on-demand energy. However in computer context, energy is supplied in the form of computer hardware and software for problem solving as computing, data storage or applications sharing. The grid has emerged as a platform that has as goal enabling coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic multidomain virtual organization [5] .
The different organizations in a grid environment federate into an alliance for a specific goal (ex. project cooperation, resources rental or application provider). They put in place what we call a Virtual Organization (VO) which constitutes the shared space between the different partners. An organization may need to participate in multiple Virtual Organizations according to its needs and thus have multiple shared spaces with multiple communities. Consider the example in Figure 1 , a physicist at "Lab1" uses a simulation application at laboratory "Lab2" and then analyzes the data using computation cycles hired from "Enterprise3" and finally stores the whole results at a storage provider.
Fig. 1. Multiple partners participate in different VOs
Virtual Organizations may have different attributes as long/short life-time and scopes that vary from intra-enterprise till hundreds of partners. These attributes depend on the goal of a VO and its problem nature. According to its goal, the Virtual Organization creation requires specification of sharing relationships for precise levels of control over how shared resources are put in place and used. This means that the access control policy should precise users' rights at the tapped resources. The granted rights may depend on the context (as time, availability or performance), the user identity and the allocated resource.
Environment Characteristics
Having a close look, we point out some issues characterizing the grid environment:
Users: The grid is often build between multiple domains where administrative authorities may add, remove or even change rights of VO users. This is typically the case when an enterprise allocates some employees for a certain project for a certain time, to transfer, after, some of these to another project. Managing the users (without prior knowledge) and their associated rights to access resources at different sites is not a simple task in such a large scale environment.
Resources: VO resources have a volatile nature as the users. A resource may be added or removed or replaced in an environment where faults are frequent. To overcome these problems, resources are often virtualized [16] and then resource description becomes more important than resource naming. Clients need then to request resources by property ex. capability, quality of service or configuration. Resources properties may be assembled within sets serving as Views for this resource ex. a device may be seen as a computing device and a storage device at the same time.
Reutilization:
The use cases of resources cannot be limited whether from the client point of view (data extraction jobs may convert a computing cluster into a high performance data server) or from the provider point of view to respond to various kinds of problems (participation in different VOs) or maximize revenue (pay per usage). Once again resources should not be referenced by name but by properties or a view which is more appropriate to the grid usage.
Multi domain aspect:
The grid is founded on the idea of dispersed users and resources within different administrative domains. Centralizing the administration of a VO implies delegating the management of all the users and resources to a single authority. However, a partner in a VO may be a rival in another, so delegating him the control and management of local resources is often not realistic. Each domain needs to manage its resources locally keeping in mind the supplied services' availability. For example, a storage provider may need to move the data on other storage devices locally for maintenance reasons without referring back to the client. An enterprise needs to add locally an employee to a certain workgroup to use the VO resources without returning back to the other partners. Excluding a central authority, the VO requires scalable multi-administration by the involved partners. By multiadministration we don't mean a domain with multiple administrators having the same rights, but rather an environment with different administrators having each partial administration rights within the whole structure. Though the grid considers interdomain aspects in the Virtual Organization, however it doesn't specify how to put in place such a space.
Delegation:
The grid problem definition aims at relieving the user from the burden of resource coordination. To enable coordinated resource sharing, delegation (may span multiple administrative domains) is necessary. Delegation is employed when at runtime a task on a device needs accessing another device on behalf of the user (accessing data, subtasks execution…). Controlling delegation and the delegated rights is necessary not to have access control security breaches.
Contexts: users may be authorized to access resources in certain contexts where outside these contexts access is forbidden. Take for example resources rental for a definite time or even the resources rental within different time periods (ex. from 8h till 15h).
Virtual Organization Lifecycle
To better show the context where this work is situated we discuss the major steps of the VO creation process ( fig.2) [19] . A goal or a requirement is the motivation for launching the process. A goal may be massive data storage, exploiting certain applications or computing resources utilization. To achieve this goal, required capabilities should be identified. These capabilities are the criteria on which the customer bases the choice of a service provider. Considering for example the goal to be data storage, the required capabilities may be a certain storage space and performance statistics to be supplied by the provider.
Fig. 2. The VO creation process along with the needs under each step
This necessitates a description language to express a wide variety of parameters. This language may be used by the provider also to describe his services. These descriptions may be published on Internet, where clients may use a discovery system to find and contact the potential providers [16] . We will not detail further this subject in this paper to focus on our main interest the access control policy.
In such a distributed system, customers need to negotiate access to services based on their requirements and the provider capabilities (ex. quality, price, content, type of allocated servers). Thus, the negotiation includes defining users and shared resources as well as specifying the sharing relationships. The process finally closes with the enforcement of the agreement that assures the runtime management of the virtual organization till the end of its lifetime. As existing solutions for access control management within virtual organization we find the Community Authorizations Service (CAS) and Virtual Organization Management System (VOMS). CAS [6] allows enforcing low level user's permission to VO resources as read/write file permissions. This solution was proposed as a mechanism to enforce access control in the Globus toolkit. On the other hand, the Virtual Organization Management System (VOMS) [7] , constitutes a server that supplies grid users with X.509 certificates extended with role and group information. The user contacts the server and obtains an X.509 certificate to be used while contacting the resource. GRASP project [8] offers an architecture that uses X.509 certificates to create secure groups (Closed Collaboration Teams) within the lifetime of the Virtual Organization. The VO itself is static, with out-of-band static policy management. These works in the access control domain fall within the "Enforce agreement" block of our life cycle (figure 2). These mechanisms refer to certain access control policy however the works don't go farther to specify this policy and its different actors. The boundaries of a VO are defined by the sharing relationships which are access control policies specifying permissions/prohibition within the VO.
The dynamicity feature of the entities within the virtual organization makes specifying the sharing relationships burdensome. The sharing relationships should be independent of the underlying physical entities by referring to the users function [11] [13] and the resources properties [12] . The role of each partner in producing this policy becomes a part of the distributed access control management [13] [14].
Access Control Model for VO
The model to be used should take into consideration the Grid environment constraints explained in the above sections. In addition to the contextual policy, the model should represent the different users and resources in such a way that these dynamic entities don't affect the policy validity. This can be done by abstracting the different entities where the management model should attribute to each side the right to manage his users and/or resources (Fig 3) . As traditional access models we find the DAC (Discretionary Access Control) [10] with its simple form the access matrix. It gives users rights to do actions on certain objects. However this model neither offers the needed abstraction nor models the different administration tasks. On the other hand, MAC models (Mandatory Access Control) propose centralized management which is not convenient for a distributed multi-administrated environment [10] . Both of these models don't treat contexts. RBAC [11] [13] introduces the "role" notion which represents a function in an organization (ex. engineer, administrator). A subject is attributed a role which is associated with a set of permissions (or privileges). Using roles to abstract the subjects responds to the grid needs, however at the "object" side RBAC doesn't offer a similar abstraction. Even though, RBAC doesn't prevent such abstraction, but this abstraction will no more be within the same framework. In addition, RBAC doesn't express contextual permissions or interdictions [12] which are important in the grid environment for example: role "engineer" has the right to use application "appl. 1" for 3 hours. DRBAC (distributed role based access control) [9] is a derivative of RBAC model proposed for scalable decentralized access control that spans multiple administrative domains. Even though the distributed management is one of the grid requirements, DRBAC still suffers from RBAC drawback concerning contexts and resources abstraction.
CBAC (Coalition based access control model) [18] is envisaged to treat access control in coalitions where each must be able to share specific resources while ensuring that these resources are safe from inappropriate access. It captures interorganization relationships and contexts however the administration model is not yet complete to model multiple administrators that each is responsible for a certain part of the system.
Or-BAC
In the grid environment each partner has resources that are put in common to be shared by the community. What we need is an access control model that indicates: who can do what in which context. Or-BAC [12] [14] access control model is proposed for modeling a security policy that is not restricted to static permissions and include contextual rules related to permissions, prohibitions and obligations. It aims at introducing an abstraction level that separates access control policy from its implementation.
Fig. 4. Or-BAC access control model
OrBAC identifies the "Organization" (figure 4) as an organized group of active entities, i.e. subjects, playing some role or other. Our virtual organization may be modeled as an organization in Or-BAC model since it is the result of a group of entities each playing a role (ex. Provider, consumer, user, resource...) within the whole structure. In this organization, users are abstracted using "Roles" which corresponds to certain privileges in an organization. Abstracting users facilitates user management in a large scale dynamic environment (It is sufficient to assign/revoke a role to a new/departing user). On the other hand, resources also are abstracted using "Views". A view corresponds to a set of objects that satisfy a common property (storage device, databases, files etc). This notion abstracts the VO resources according to their usage and capabilities. Activities are also used to abstract actions as "read", "write" so it corresponds to a combination of actions.
Finally, the policy is stated in terms of roles, activities, views conditioned by certain temporal or spatial parameters (ex. Secure connection, daytime, time), which are specified as Contexts. Or-BAC with these notions responds to the grid requirements. We may consider a Virtual Organization to be an organization in Or-BAC. Entities in the virtual organization would be roles instead of users, and views instead of objects. The large scale problem of the grid (users, resources) is overcome by the offered abstraction. On the other hand, the multi-administration is also taken into consideration as we will see in the following sections.
Or-BAC Relationships
There are eight basic sets of entities: Org (organization: an organized group of subjects, playing some role within the group), S (a set of subjects), A (a set of actions), O (a set of objects), R (a set of roles), A (a set of activities), V (a set of views), C (a set of contexts). Or-BAC considers that org ⊆ S, S ⊆ O. Any entity may have attributes, for instance if S is a subject, then name(S), address(S) represents the name and the address of subject S. Or-BAC also defines relations between these sets: − Empower is a relation over domains Org x S x R, to express that org empowers subject s in role r. We consider that the grid Virtual Organization is an organization Org in the Or-BAC context. To construct this space, add users, attribute users to roles and resources to views and specify access permissions, the management model is needed. It should control the activities: management of organizations, management of roles, activities, views and contexts, assignment of users to roles, assignment of permissions to roles, assignment of users to permissions.
Or-BAC Administration Model (AdOrBAC)
AdOrBAC is the administration model of Or-BAC. It defines special views as URA (user role assignment), PRA (permission role assignment)... Objects belonging to these views have special semantics; they will be respectively interpreted as an assignment of user to role and permission to role. Inserting (deleting) an object in these views enables an authorized entity to respectively assign (revoke) a user to a role and permission to a role. Distributing the administration responsibilities among the grid partners consists of defining which roles are permitted to access the views URA, PRA … or to more specific views when the role has not complete access to one of these views (Fig 5) .
Fig. 5. OrBAC and AdOrBAC model
URA in AdOr-BAC. It is used to determine who is allowed to assign a user to a role and on which conditions. Assigning a user to a role equals adding a new object in a given view called URA (fig 6) . Three attributes are associated with this object: − Subject to designate the subject which is related to the assignment. − Role that corresponds to the role to which the subject will be assigned. − Org to represent the organization to which the subject is assigned.
Fig. 6. User role assignment
So to add a user to a special role "physicist" in the physics department "phy-dept" at organization "Lab", we have to create a view "URA-physicist -phy -dept" defined as follows:
∀ ura, Use (Lab, ura, URA-physicist -phy -dept) <=> Use (Lab, ura, URA) ^ (role (ura) = physicist) ^ ( org (ura) = phy-dept)
This way we defined a view for the physicists in the phy-dept. There is a relationship between adding an object to this view and the relation "empower":
"Assign" is the activity to be given to the administrator to do this assignment job.
Permission (Lab, administrator, assign, URA-physicist -phy-dept, default)
This method allows attributing roles administration to a certain administrator whom we grant the permission to assign/revoke users. We may attribute a member of a certain domain the right to add "ura" objects in a view defined of his domain users we may then satisfy the requirement that each domain keeps control on its users. PRA in AdOr-BAC. Permission role assignment follows the same logic as URA concerning adding an object to a view; however the object has 5 attributes:
Issuer= issuing organization Grantee, privilege, target = role, activity and view concerned by the permission Context = designate the context in which the rule can be applied.
There is a link between adding an object to this view and the relation permission:
grantee(pra), privilege(pra), target(pra), context(pra))
View Object Assignment. In analogy to URA [14] , we would like to define a view including certain collection of objects and attribute the manage activity to an administrator (ex. View-admin). Associating a user with the role View-admin
Empower (org, user, View-admin)
Attributing permission "manage" to the role "View-admin":
Where VOA-org2 is the view of a group of resources having an attribute org that is equal to org2, it can be defined as follows:
∀ voa, Use(org, voa, VOA-org2) <=> Use(org, voa, VOA)^ (org(voa)=org2)
So finally attributing a resource or object to a view in the organization is equivalent to adding an object voa with attributes (object to be added, view to which it should be added, in org as organization) to the VOA-org2 view. The view-admin is in charge of that.
Virtual Organization Modeling
Consider the scenario in figure 7 where two organizations need to cooperate forming a Virtual Organization.
Consider the simplified case where organization org2 supplies the resources (provider) and org1 contains the users (consumer). Putting in place the VO needs to define the participating entities from both sides including roles, views, activities and the administration authorities.
Modeling this environment using Or-BAC, we start by the management of the virtual organization itself. Considering that VO is an organization in Or-BAC framework, such an entity may have attributes. As discriminating attributes there are the involved participants, a name discriminating a certain VO within the different VOs that can be set up among the same partners, and may be a certain expiry date after which the cooperation is terminated. 
Fig. 7. Or-BAC model in Grid environment
At the administration plan: we should define the relevant roles in the Virtual Organization as:
Relevant-role (VO, Role-org1Admin, PR-org1Admin, ViewAdmin, ActivityAdmin).
In the same way, the relevant views and the Relevant activities names should be defined for the VO. To attribute to a certain "org1admin" the role "Role-org1Admin" that has the responsibility to assign/revoke roles to the users of organization org1:
Empower (VO, org1admin, Role-org1Admin); Permission (VO, roleadmin, manage, URA-org1,default)
Where URA-org1 is defined as:
∀ Ura, Use (VO, ura, URA-org1) <=> Use (VO, ura, URA) ^ org (ura) = org1
To attribute to a certain "org1admin" the role "PR-org1Admin" that has the responsibility to assign/revoke permissions to roles of organization org1:
Empower (VO, org1admin, PR-org1Admin) Permission (VO, PR-org1Admin, manage, PRA-org1, default)
Where PRA-org1 is defined as: To attribute to a certain "org2admin" the role "ViewAdmin" that has the responsibility to assign/revoke views to objects of organization org2:
Where VOA-org2 is defined as:
Relevant-view(VO ,view(voa))
To attribute to a certain "org2admin" the role "ActivityAdmin" that has the responsibility to assign/revoke activities to actions comprehensible by organization org2 and its different resources: This way using Or-BAC we modeled our grid environment abstracting the users and resources within a single framework. This framework allows different partners to participate in specifying the access control policy keeping the autonomy and flexibility in managing their local assets. This formalism should be employed within a cooperation and negotiation framework to put in place a multi administrated VO.
Delegation:
Modeling delegation is not shown yet. We will pass in general to see how is the demarche; however we will not enter in details being limited in this paper. Delegation in the grid context is to give some device working on behalf of a user some rights to enable it access other resources. This set of rights is normally a subset of the set of rights of the user himself. Delegation may be supported by the model when the internal policy of an organization authorizes giving the administrator role the right to assign roles for subjects in other domains for a special task. So to model delegation there should be a view containing the delegated entities and the right to give them roles or sub roles in order to complete the assigned task. This way we can control delegation which depends on the policy of the client as well as the provider. The client may sometimes not trust the object and thus doesn't delegate it. The same can be said about the provider who may not accept that his resources go farther to propagate anonymous malicious activities for example (Distributed Denial of Service attacks).
Modeling Issues
It is necessary to refer back to the set of constraints defined above in section 3 and relate them to the model terms. Abstraction of entities at the VO level allows having two distinct levels: valid policy and dynamic entities. On the other hand, every partner has his settled internal access control system. It is not desired to modify this system (users, roles, privileges…) each time the partner adheres to a different virtual organization. Though the activities of user in the virtual organization may reveal the hierarchy and the different responsibilities between the involved users, however this should not compromise the internal organization structure. The different privileges given to users at the virtual organization level should be subject to the intra-organization management. The user role assignment policy is an internal issue according to which the organization attributes a role to a user. The same discussion can be employed to argue that the OVA policy also should be internal to the provider domain. However this internal policy should take into consideration the commitments of the provider to supply a specific service with particular characteristics. Following this logic we attribute the URA to the organization of the user and the VOA to the organization under which the objects are administered. We base on a pre-virtual organization negotiation to give certain roles (ex. Role admin, View admin) certain privileges on certain resources within certain contexts. These contexts may depend on specific partner parameters (resource quality of service, rental time, and specific periods of time…).
Conclusion and Future Works
The grid has a goal enabling coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic multi-domain virtual organization. For this reason it sets up a virtual organization which constitutes the shared common space between the different partners. However the grid doesn't indicate how to construct such a space in a dynamic, multiadministrated environment. On the way to dynamically create virtual organizations we had to find a model that organizes the different responsibilities in a VO. It should take into consideration the environment constraints as multi-organizational aspect, large scale, dynamic resource allocation… We chose Or-BAC for this mission which shows flexibility to model these situations. Or-BAC models a multi-administered environment using the "role view activity" abstraction which abides to the other constraints (large scale and dynamic resources). With this abstraction Or-BAC policy rules are independent of the physical underlying infrastructure. What is still need to be detailed in our model is the delegation aspect which is necessary for the domain of ubiquitous computing. We will treat this issue independently [15] .
The next step after modeling is to implement the automated creation of such environment by discovery, negotiation, and generation of an SLA-like policy [8] which may be powered with QoS parameters along with the access control ones. Finally this policy needs enforcement using appropriate mechanisms within the grid layers [5] .
